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Abstract
We study a two sector endogenous growth model with environmen-
tal quality with two goods and two factors of production, one clean
and one dirty. Technological change creates clean or dirty innovations.
We compare the laissez-faire equilibrium and the social optimum and
study first- and second-best policies. Optimal policy encourages re-
search toward clean technologies. In a second-best world, we claim
that a portfolio that includes a tax on the polluting good combined
with optimal innovation subsidy policies is less costly than increas-
ing the price of the polluting good alone. Moreover, a discriminating
innovation subsidy policy is preferable to a non-discriminating one.
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The reduction of greenhouse gas emissions makes technological change and
the development of renewable energy central issues, with important impli-
cations for policy design. Some policies, such as a tax on emissions or a
tradable emissions permit system, make emissions expensive. Other policies
focus on reducing the cost of R&D. However, not all technological change
targets pollution savings. For instance, technological change in fossil-fuel
(e.g., oil) extraction industries has definitely contributed to both the discov-
ery of new sources, as is recently the case in Brazil, and to the possibility of
using non-conventional oil sources such as tar sands, with no particular em-
phasis on environmental friendliness. At the same time, a great deal of focus
has been placed on the role of innovation in lowering the cost of carbon-free
sources.1
In this context, the contribution of this paper is to study environmental
and technology policies in a two sector endogenous growth model where the
two types of technological change - clean and dirty - are present, which al-
lows us to consider not only the usual R&D distortions discussed by Stokey
[18] but also the role of R&D in internalizing the pollution externality and
its policy implications. There is evidence that in a market economy re-
search tends to be under-provided relative to the social optimum (Jones and
Williams [13], [14]). However, this result does not take into account the effect
of growth on environmental quality. Our concern goes to how environmental
and technology policies affect both the rate and the type of technological
1Carraro and Siniscalco [5] present studies showing that large corporations typically
adjust to environmental policy measures through innovation, rather than by switching
inputs or reducing output. They also mention the fact that without innovation very high
taxes are required to curb CO2 emissions.
2
change. The question is not only, “are there limits to growth?” as in Stokey
[19], but also in the kind of innovations we are interested in and the incen-
tives policy should give. The extent to which research is environmentally
oriented is a matter of discussion, as are its policy implications.
We follow the work of Acemoglu [1] and Acemoglu and Zilibotti [2],
where two types of innovation are carried out by profit maximizing firms,
and extend it to include the environmental dimension. We consider two
goods and two factors of production, one clean and one dirty. Pollution
is a by-product of the dirty-intensive good production, which affects envi-
ronmental quality and negatively influences consumers’ utility. There are
two different R&D sectors associated with each sector of production. R&D
firms develop new clean or dirty complementary intermediates, depending
on relative profitability.
Our purpose is to study the impact of policy-induced changes on the rate
of innovation and the type of technical change. To this end, we focus on the
induced impact on the relative productivity of dirty and clean technologies,
a measure of the dirty-bias in the economy.2 We study the implementation
of the social optimum. First- and second-best policies are examined, mainly
focusing on the consequences of the composition of innovation.
In the laissez-faire economy, the research effort directed at new dirty
complementary intermediates when compared to the one devoted to new
clean intermediates is relatively too high. Therefore, technology is too dirty-
biased and emissions intensity of final output is too high.
There are three distortions in our economy: the environmental exter-
nality, the surplus appropriability problem of the research sector, and the
2This is in contrast to Acemoglu’s [1] biased technical change, where the relative factor
rewards respond to changes in the relative endowments.
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monopoly power of intermediate inputs’ producers. In a first-best world,
three policies are needed to optimally address the three market failures:
environmental policy, subsidies for research, and subsidies for the monop-
olists. We compute the optimal values of these economic policy tools. We
show that the optimal policy implements the optimal rate of innovation and
simultaneously encourages a change in the quality of research towards the
clean sector of the economy.
Finally, we study second-best policy, which depends on the policy-maker’s
ultimate goal. As expected, we show that implementing the efficient dirty-
bias only through emissions pricing policies has such a strong negative im-
pact on economic activity that such policies have little political appeal. This
result suggests that in the presence of a pollution externality there is an ad-
ditional rationale to promote R&D. In this context, if the regulator chooses
to subsidize innovation, we show that while a non-discriminating policy be-
tween the dirty and clean sectors has no impact on the level of emissions
intensity, keeping it at the laissez-faire level, independently of the subsidy
rate, when the subsidies are different emissions intensity decreases. How-
ever, in order to implement the efficient level of emissions, an additional tax
on the polluting good is needed.
In endogenous growth models with environmental concerns, stagnation
along the optimal path is avoided, either through increased abatement or
through technological progress, as shown in Bovenberg and Smulders [4],
Stokey [19], Elbasha and Roe [7], and Reis [16], among others. Therefore,
the development of environmentally- friendly technologies protects the en-
vironment and, at the same time, drives economic growth, lowering the
trade-off between environmental quality and growth. Grimaud [9] has also
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focused on the importance of endogenous research in market economies with
environmental damages. Our paper extends this literature since we consider
two different R&D types.
Ricci [17] and Hart [11], [12], analyze, in a vintage model, the effects of
environmental regulation on the quantity of research effort, and on its quality
(allocation of research inputs between research sectors). However, we follow
a different framework that focuses primarily on the relative productivity of
dirty and clean technologies.
More recently, Grimaud and Rouge [10] study an endogenous growth
model with a polluting and a non-polluting resource with specific research
sectors. These authors study the effects of optimal economic policy on the
reallocation of research efforts across the two sectors. In contrast to our
paper, Grimaud and Rouge focus only on first-best policy. In a second-
best context, our results also support the arguments of Montgomery and
Smith [15] and Fisher and Newell [8], although the context is different from
ours in both cases. As claimed by these authors, an emissions price high
enough to induce the needed innovation cannot be credibly implemented
and, therefore, R&D is the key for dealing with climate change. In this
context, a portfolio that includes a tax on the polluting good combined with
optimal innovation subsidy policies is less expensive than one that increases
the price of the polluting good alone. We further extend this result by
showing that a discriminating innovation subsidy policy is preferable to a
non-discriminating one.
The paper is organized as follows. The model is presented in Section 2.
The regulated equilibrium is derived in Section 3. In Section 4, the solution
to the social planner’s problem is discussed and compared to the laissez-faire
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solution. Section 5 focuses on policy implications. Section 6 summarizes the
main conclusions. Technical details are presented in the appendices.
2 The Model
The economy is closed and produces a final output from two commodities,
which use primary factors of production and a set of differentiated inter-
mediate inputs. The model builds upon Acemoglu [1] and Acemoglu and
Zilibotti [2], introducing preferences for environmental quality.
Consumers There are many identical infinitely lived consumers who get
utility from consumption of final output and environmental quality. Utility





(logC + µ logQ) e−ρtdt (1)
where C is consumption of the final output, Q measures the quality of the
environment, µ reflects environmental preferences and ρ is the rate of time
preference. The utility function is increasing and strictly concave in C and
Q as long as µ > 0. The representative consumer values consumption more
than environmental quality, such that µ < 1. Consumers are endowed with
two primary factors of production: a clean (L) one and a dirty (Z) one.3
Final output sector The final output Y is produced from two goods, YL
and YZ , through a Cobb-Douglas production function, as in Acemoglu and
Zilibotti [2]4
Y = Y γLY
1−γ
Z (2)
3As in Acemoglu [1] and Acemoglu and Zilibotti [2], in order to simplify the analysis
we do not allow factor accumulation.
4Acemoglu [1] considers two types of goods but the elasticity of substitution between
them is different from one. Acemoglu and Zilibotti [2] consider a Cobb-Douglas with a
continuous of goods. The fact that we assume an elasticity of substitution of 1 implies that
we focus only on the relative physical productivity of dirty and clean factors and not on
the corresponding relative factor rewards. Thus, according to Acemoglu’s [1] terminology,
we focus on factor-augmenting technical change and not on factor-biased technical change.
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YL is intensive in the clean factor, L, while YZ uses the dirty factor, Z,



















where β ∈ (0, 1), and L and Z are assumed to be supplied inelastically.
The L-intensive good is produced from the clean factor and a range of L-
complementary (L-augmenting) intermediates (xL). The range of interme-
diate inputs of type xL available at a given time period, is denoted by NL.
The amount of input j used is denoted by xL (j). The production function
for YZ uses the dirty factor intensively and Z-complementary intermediates
(xZ). NZ and xZ (j) are similar.
The ratio (NZ/NL) determines the relative productivity of dirty and
clean technologies, and measures the dirty-bias in the economy.
The markets for YL and YZ are assumed to be perfectly competitive.
Intermediate inputs sectors Each input j ∈ [0, NL] and j ∈ [0,NZ ] is
supplied by a monopolist who faces a marginal cost, ψ, in terms of the final
good, of producing intermediate inputs, which is the same for all intermedi-
ate inputs. The monopolist sets the price for the intermediate input, χL (j)
or χZ (j) .
R&D sector Technical change is modeled as the invention of new dirty
and clean intermediates. It is assumed that only the final good is used as
an input in this sector. The production functions for the innovations are
ṄL = ηLRL and ṄZ = ηZRZ (4)
5For example, we can think of Y as the production of energy, with YL as the nonemitting
renewable energy sector and YZ as emitting fossil-fueled energy. According to this example,
the model incorporates innovation in both sectors. While innovation increases renewable
energy efficiency by augmenting the productivity of renewables, it is reasonable to assume
that fossil-fueled technologies will also innovate, but are not necessarily pollution-saving.
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where RL and RZ are spending on R&D for the clean and dirty factor-
intensive good, respectively. One unit of final good spent on R&D directed
at L-complementary intermediates will generate ηL new varieties of clean
intermediates. ṄZ is explained similarly.
Research is motivated by the future benefits that emerge from the discov-
ery of a new variety. A firm that discovers a new variety receives a patent
on this intermediate input and becomes a monopolist. Thus, R&D firms
develop new clean or dirty intermediates depending on relative profitability.
Budget constraint The budget constraint of the economy is












+ (RL +RZ) = Y (5)
where I denotes investment, and R is total R&D expenditure.
Environmental quality We model the quality of the environment as a
flow variable. Environmental damages are a by-product of the dirty sector.







, 0 < δ < 1 (6)
which are proportional to the production of YZ , and δ is a technology pa-
rameter that quantifies the detrimental effect of YZ on the environment.




6This approach is followed, for example, by Canada, which has implemented a domestic
trading system in which emission reduction credits can be traded to limit carbon emissions
from much of the economy’s energy and industrial sectors. The emission targets are
expressed in terms of a reduction in emission intensity rather than in absolute levels of
emissions reductions (Amano and Sedjo [3]).
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3 Equilibrium in the Regulated Economy
In this section we derive the equilibrium with government intervention.
There are three distortions in this economy: (i) the surplus appropriabil-
ity problem tends to generate too little research, (ii) intermediate goods are
produced by monopolists, producing less than optimally, and finally, (iii)
because of the environmental externality, production of YZ is larger than
optimal. We assume that the government is able to address all imperfec-
tions.
We consider the following set of instruments: (i) a proportional subsidy,
φ > 1, paid by the government to the R&D sector for each new design, which
is assumed to be the same for new L and Z-complementary intermediates.
This subsidy decreases the costs of a new variety to 1/ (φηi) , i = L,Z, (ii) a
subsidy, s, paid by the government to each producer of intermediate inputs,
and finally, (iii) a tax, τ , levied on the polluting sector, proportional to the
emissions of the dirty good.
Firms in the clean sector maximize profits, choosing L and xL(j), taking
as given the price of their product, pL, the price of the primary factor, ωL,
the prices of the intermediate inputs, χL (j), and the range of intermediate
inputs, NL. Firms in the dirty sector pay the environmental tax and face a
similar profit maximization problem.
From the first-order conditions of these problems, the rewards for the























The demand for each intermediate input is the same for all j ∈ [0, NL] and
for all j ∈ [0,NZ ] .
Each monopolist in the intermediate goods sectors chooses prices, χL (j)
and χZ (j), that maximize profits, taking into account the demand functions
in (8) and the subsidy paid by the government. Profits are maximized by
χL (j) = χZ (j) =
ψ(1−s)
1−β , j ∈ [0, NL] and j ∈ [0,NZ ]. To simplify the
algebra, we normalize the marginal cost to ψ = 1−β. In equilibrium, prices
are χL (j) = χZ (j) = 1− s.
Therefore, price, quantity, and, hence, the level of profits are the same
for all firms operating in each intermediate inputs sector. Using the prices
and demands above, the monopolists’ profits are














R&D firms develop new clean or dirty intermediates depending on the
relative profitability given by the net present value of profits.
To maintain asset market equilibrium, the rate of return from holding













These equations relate the present value of future profits, V (the value of a
firm in the intermediate inputs sector), to the flow of profits, π.
We will focus on the long-run balanced growth path of this economy,
where prices and the interest rate are constant. Thus, the V̇ terms are zero.





















The greater VL is relative to VZ , the greater are the incentives to develop
clean intermediates rather than dirty ones.
There is free entry and exit in the R&D sector. Thus, in equilibrium,
the value of a firm in the intermediate inputs sector (Vi, i = L,Z) must be
equal to the cost of a new variety ( 1φηi
, i = L,Z).
We assume a balanced growth path (BGP), where prices pL and pZ
are constant, and NL and NZ grow at the same constant rate. In equilib-
rium, along a BGP, all variables grow at the same rate: Ẏ /Y = ṄL/NL =
ṄZ/NZ = Ċ/C = ẎZ/YZ = ẎL/YL = g. In order to generate growth, the
number of new designs must be expanding over time. This occurs if the
spending on R&D is increasing. More spending means more ideas, sustain-
ing growth. In this case, the growth in ideas is clearly related to the final
output growth (ṘL/RL = ṘZ/RZ = g).
There will be innovation in both sectors if the following condition holds
φηLVL = φηZVZ or φηLπL = φηZπZ (12)
According to this condition, it is equally profitable to invest in the devel-
opment of L and Z-complementary intermediate inputs, so that along the










This condition can be solved for the dirty-bias in the regulated economy,
(NZ/NL).
Substituting (8) into the production functions (3) we obtain the market
productions of YL and YZ , given NL and NZ . The markets for YL and YZ

























Substituting for YL and YZ and solving for p we get the relative price
of the two goods as a function of the environmental tax, of the relative
productivity of dirty and clean technologies (NZ/NL), and of the relative
factor supply, Z/L:









From (8) and (15), the relative demand of intermediate inputs as a func-





























where RE stands for the regulated economy. This equation defines the rela-
tive physical productivity of dirty versus clean factors along the BGP, which
is positively affected by the relative productivity of the R&D labs, ηZηL
, and
the relative weight in the production of Y , 1−γγ , and is negatively affected
by the environmental tax, τ .
Substituting (17) in (16), we obtain the relative demand of intermediate












From the maximization of (1), we obtain ĊC = r − ρ. Along a BGP,
all variables grow at the same rate, g = r − ρ. This long-run growth rate
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is obtained in the following Proposition, in terms of the parameters of the
model, the endowments of the economy, and the policy instruments.7
Proposition 1 The growth rate of the regulated economy at the BGP is
given by















Proof. The free-entry condition in R&D, VL =
1
φηL
, together with (11),






L = r, in the steady state. Also, assuming the
price of the final good as the numéraire, the following relationship between








= 1. Solving this condition
for pL and substituting it in the free entry condition together with (15), we
obtain the growth rate of the economy for a given (NZ/NL),




















Combining (17) with (20), the result follows.
In the next section we solve for the social planner’s problem and compare
the optimal solution with the laissez-faire economy, which may be obtained
from (16), (17) and (19) when φ = 1 and s = τ = 0.
7We briefly analyze the stability properties of the model outside the BGP: the equi-
librium condition for the relative profitability of innovations along the BGP is given by
ηZVZ
ηLVL
= 1 (see (12)). If ηZVZ
ηLVL
> 1 (< 1) R&D will be undertaken only in dirty complemen-
tary (clean complementary) intermediates. Since the relative profitability of creating dirty
complementary intermediates VZ
VL
is decreasing in NZ
NL









(logC + µ logQ) e−ρtdt (21)
s.t. (2), (3), (4), (5), (6)
L = L̄; Z = Z̄ and NL (0) ,NZ (0) > 0 given
Thus, the current value Hamiltonian for the social planner’s problem is


































xL (j) dj + ψ
∫ NZ
0
xZ (j) dj − I
]





where pC , rL, rZ , pI , λL, λZ , pQ denote the shadow prices corresponding to
the relevant constraints.
Solving for the social planner’s problem we obtain the efficient dirty-
bias which is characterized in the next Proposition, where LF stands for
laissez-faire.




























, 0 < κ  1 (24)
represents the pollution externality. Since κ < 1, the efficient dirty-bias is
smaller than the equilibrium one of the laissez-faire economy, given by (17)
for τ = 0.
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− rZ = 0 (26)
∂H
∂C
= C−1 − pC = 0 (27)
∂H
∂Q








−β Zβ + pIψ = 0 (30)
∂H
∂I
= −pC − pI = 0 (31)
∂H
∂RL
= −pC + λLηL = 0 (32)
∂H
∂RZ
= −pC + λZηZ = 0 (33)




β − pIψxL (34)




β − pIψxZ (35)




−ρt = 0; lim
t−→∞
λZNZe
−ρt = 0 (36)
Solving (29) and (30) for the demands of the intermediate inputs, and com-






























The optimal demand for each input is the same for all j ∈ [0, NL] and
j ∈ [0, NZ ], and it is constant along the BGP.
8 From (26), (27), and (28),
8 In the first-order conditions (34) and (35) this is already assumed.
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conditions (32) and (33), λ̇LλL =
λ̇Z
λZ
follows. Thus, equating (34) and (35),










Substituting (37) and (38) into the production functions (3), we obtain the
optimal YL and YZ, given NL and NZ . Substituting these into the relative
marginal product of YZ , given by (14), and solving, we get the efficient mar-
ginal rate of transformation between the two goods, as a function of both
the relative productivity of dirty and clean technologies, (NZ/NL), and the














Substituting (40) and rL and rZ in (39), and solving for (NZ/NL), we get
equation (23). Notice that when there is no externality, as in Acemoglu [1],
κ is equal to 1.9
This Proposition shows that the technology is too dirty-biased (higher
NZ/NL) in the laissez-faire economy relative to the optimum. As environ-
mental damages are external, there is too much research effort directed at
new dirty complementary intermediates. Moreover, the higher the environ-
mental concern (the smaller κ), the lower the efficient dirty-bias. In the
next section we look at policies that reduce the dirty-bias in the economy,
promoting the innovation of new clean intermediates.
From (23) it follows that in the laissez-faire economy the relative pro-
duction of YZ is greater than the efficient one. Consequently, the emissions
9κ is studied in detail in Appendix A.
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intensity of final output is higher than optimal. The laissez-faire pollution
level is higher than optimal, as expected.
From (37), (38), and (40), it follows that the relative demand of inter-
















Notice that for a given technology, internalizing pollution implies a decrease
in the relative demand of intermediate inputs. After taking into account
the endogenous technology, this demand is the same as in the laissez-faire
economy (see (18)).
The long-run growth rate and the optimal innovation rate for this econ-
omy are presented in Proposition 3.
















γ − ρ (42)
The optimal growth rate is higher (i) the larger the country’s endowment
of L and Z, (ii) the smaller the cost of new intermediate inputs (larger ηi,
i = L,Z), (iii) the smaller the rate of time preference (smaller ρ), and, (iv)
the less consumers value the environment (lower µ).
Proof. From conditions (25), (27), (29), (32), (34), (37), together with
(40), and the production function, (2), and the relative marginal product
of YZ , given by (14), we obtain, after some algebra, the growth rate of the























Combining (23) with (43), the result for g∗ follows.
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Differentiating the optimal growth rate (42) with respect to the relevant
parameter, the comparative static results follow.
Notice that κ (equation (24)) is endogenously determined (κ is studied
in detail in Appendix A). However, taking this into account does not change
our results.10
In the model the impact of the environmental externality is captured by
µ. When consumers do not value environmental quality (µ = 0), from (48),
it follows that κ is equal to 1. When environmental quality is as important
to consumers’ welfare as consumption (µ = 1), then κ is negative. The more
consumers value the environment (higher µ, for µ < 1), and, therefore, the
larger the environmental externality, the lower is κ,11 and the lower is the
optimal growth rate of the economy.12
The environmental externality influences the growth rate through (i) the
adjustment on the intermediate inputs, and (ii) the incentives to innovation.
Before incorporating the efficient dirty-bias, the growth rate of the economy,
given by (43), captures the externality through the adjustment on the in-
termediate inputs, for a given (NZ/NL). However, the externality is only
fully accounted for after incorporating the optimal dirty-bias of technology,
as shown in (42).
10The comparative static results in Proposition 3 already take into account the endo-
geneity of κ.
11Proof in Appendix A.
















γ . This means that µ <

































. Therefore, the solution
we are considering is only possible for environmental preferences such that 0 < µ < µ̄.
A very high environmental concern by consumers would imply either zero or negative
growth. Also, from the maximization of the utility function, it has to be the case that
g∗ < ρ
1−µ
. If this condition holds for µ = 0, it also holds for positive values of µ.
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The optimal growth rate, (42), internalizes both the environmental exter-







The environmental externality (κ < 1) contributes to a decrease in g∗ rela-






> 1) work in
the opposite way.13
The laissez-faire equilibrium growth rate, gLF , can be smaller or larger
than the optimal growth rate, g∗. If the distortion for the monopoly and
R&D distortions prevails, then g∗ > gLF . However, the optimal growth
rate is lower than it would be without environmental externalities. In such
a case, when the environmental externality is not too large (large κ), the
optimal solution is characterized by boosting growth and decreasing the
dirty-bias in the economy. If the distortion for the externality prevails, then
g∗ < gLF . The laissez-faire growth rate will be larger than the optimal rate
the stronger is the impact of the environmental externality on welfare (the
smaller is κ).
The comparison of the share of the clean (YL/Y ) and dirty goods (YZ/Y )
in the final output in the laissez-faire equilibrium and the optimum is shown
in the following Proposition.
Proposition 4 The value of YL/Y in the long run of the laissez-faire equi-
librium is lower than the optimal one, and the opposite occurs with YZ/Y .
Also, the more consumers value the environment (the higher µ), the larger
is the difference between the laissez-faire and the optimal shares mentioned
above. Also, emissions per unit of output are constant along the BGP and
13Jones and Williams [13] present empirical evidence, using econometric estimates of
returns to R&D, that socially optimal R&D investment is at least four times greater than
actual spending (accounting for the current patent system and subsidies to research).
Jones and Williams [14], using a calibrated model, and in the absence of taxes and subsi-
dies, confirm the result of underinvestment in R&D, not taking into account environmental
quality.
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Moreover, the more consumers value the environment (higher µ), the lower
is the optimal emissions intensity of final output.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Summarizing, for a given (NZ/NL), the efficient relative production of
the polluting good, and thus, the efficient level of emissions intensity of fi-
nal output, is achieved by adjusting the production of intermediate inputs.
The laissez-faire relative demand for dirty complementary intermediates is
greater than the efficient one, as shown in (41) and (16). With endoge-
nous technology, the internalization of the pollution externality also implies
moving R&D toward new clean complementary intermediates.
5 Policy Implications
We first define the first-best optimal policy, which works as a benchmark.
Then, we look at second-best policy, assuming that the government is re-
stricted to only one policy instrument when the optimal policy would require
several.
5.1 First-best policy
The optimal policy is summarized in the following Proposition.
Proposition 5 The social optimum can be implemented through (i) a sub-
sidy to the R&D sector given by φ∗ = 1/ψ = 1/(1 − β), (ii) a subsidy to





























Proof. Comparing the policy-ridden solution given by (19) with the so-
cial planner’s solution (42), the results follow. κs is the solution for equation
(48) in the Appendix, and ∂κs∂µ < 0 holds.
The optimal tax increases with µ and decreases with the elasticity of Y
with respect to the polluting good, γ.
The first-best policy, summarized in the previous Proposition, imple-
ments not only the optimal growth rate of the economy, but also the opti-
mal emissions intensity of final output, as it induces the efficient demand
for intermediates and the efficient dirty-bias in the economy. The environ-
mental tax decreases the demand for the dirty intermediates and, therefore,
depresses the value of patents of new dirty complementary intermediates,
encouraging environmentally oriented research. Since R&D firms develop
new clean or new dirty complementary intermediates depending on relative
profitability, research toward new clean complementary intermediates is en-
couraged, thus, increasing the clean-bias in the economy toward its efficient
level. R&D effort is optimally reallocated across sectors in response to the
environmental tax. Therefore, the optimal level of emissions per unit of
output is achieved.
5.2 Second-best policy
We now look at second-best policy. As the experience with climate negoti-
ations shows, it has been difficult for nations to engage in a significant en-
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vironmental policy intervention. In this second-best setting, policy targeted
to create incentives for technological change can be justified on economic
grounds. Moreover, policies targeted to subsidizing technology have in gen-
eral more political support than policies that increase costs, as the direct
benefits are focused and the costs are dispersed, while they contribute to
boosting growth. On the other hand, given the difficulty of governments in
committing at present to sufficiently stringent enough environmental policy
targets in anticipation of future emissions policy, to rely on technological
policy makes it possible to undertake current commitments.
We look at each instrument separately below. Assuming that each gov-
ernmental department establishes its own policy to pursue a given goal,
perhaps responding to different lobbies, the interaction between them is not
very likely to be taken into account when setting the level of each instrument.
In this context, we examine the side effects of the different instruments when
each one is decided independently of the others. Two kinds of instruments
are considered: a tax on the polluting good and subsidies to the research
sectors.
(1) Tax on the polluting good
Let us consider an emission tax, τ , on the polluting sector to control
emissions intensity. For gLF < g∗, a positive tax on the polluting good
further increases the gap between the two growth rates. However, for gLF >

















Since this second-best tax is lower than the first-best one, the efficient
level of emission intensity is not achieved. Thus, despite the fact that the
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economy is moving in the right direction, decreasing the relative production
of YZ , and the level of emissions intensity when compared to the laissez-faire,
pollution still remains above the efficient level.
Hence, for emissions pricing alone to provide sufficient incentive to im-
plement the efficient dirty-bias, and eventually the efficient level of emissions
intensity, the level of the tax has to be larger, implying more serious conse-
quences to growth. Therefore, such policies have little political appeal.
(2) Subsidy to R&D
If gLF > g∗ any positive subsidy increases the gap between the two
growth rates. In contrast, if gLF < g∗, it is possible to achieve the optimal
growth.
(i) Considering a technology policy that subsidizes both R&D sectors at
the same rate, that is, (φ = φZ = φL), growth is boosted, as mentioned














However, since the introduction of φ does not require any adjustment on
the demand of intermediate inputs, for a given (NZ/NL), nor on the efficient
dirty-bias, the relative production of YZ is the same as in the laissez-faire
economy. Thus, emissions per unit of output are the same as in the laissez-
faire economy, above the efficient level. Notice that this is always the case,
as long as the subsidies are the same between sectors, that is, independently
of the rate.
(ii) In contrast to the previous case, the government’s technology policy
may discriminate between the new designs by paying a different subsidy to
each sector, that is, φZ = φL. By computing the growth rate of the regulated
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in order to implement the optimal growth rate. Also, if φZ = κsφL holds,
the efficient dirty-bias is implemented. Solving this system of equations,



















s , for which both
the optimal growth rate of the economy and the efficient dirty-bias in the
economy are obtained. Since κs < 1, φZ < φL, the new Z-complementary
intermediates become relatively more costly than the new L-complementary
intermediates. This will encourage research toward new clean complemen-
tary intermediates, thereby increasing the clean-bias in the economy.
Discriminating between R&D subsidies in favor of the clean sector cor-
rects for the technology externalities and at the same time reduces emissions.
However, there is no adjustment on the demand of intermediate inputs, for
a given (NZ/NL). Moreover, after endogenizing for technical change, the
relative demand of dirty complementary intermediates is higher than the
optimal one. Therefore, although the efficient dirty-bias is implemented,
the relative production of YZ is greater than the efficient one, and, conse-
quently, so is the emissions intensity. However, the economy moves toward
the optimum, that is, in the right direction, and produces a lower share of
emissions in the final output than in the laissez-faire equilibrium.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we develop an endogenous growth model that incorporates the
welfare effects of environmental quality and innovation. The final output is
produced from two goods and two factors of production, one clean and one
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dirty. There are two different R&D sectors associated with each sector of
production. Technological change extends the range of two types of interme-
diate inputs: clean and dirty complementary intermediates. Production of
the dirty intensive good yields emissions that decrease environmental quality
and, therefore, consumers’ utility.
We describe the regulated economy and compare the optimum to the
laissez-faire regime. The laissez-faire growth rate can be higher or lower
than the optimal growth rate since the environmental externality and the
monopoly and R&D distortions have opposite effects. We have shown that
neither the rate of innovation nor the research effort directed at new clean
complementary intermediates in the market economy are optimal. For this
reason, the dirty-bias of technology in the laissez-faire economy is too high.
We compute the optimal values for the first-best policy tools: a subsidy
to the R&D sector to encourage research, a subsidy to the producers of
intermediate inputs to neutralize the effect of monopoly pricing, and an
environmental tax on emissions to eliminate the pollution externality. We
show that the optimal policy implements the efficient rate of innovation and
also encourages environmentally oriented research in the regulated economy,
reallocating R&D efforts across the two sectors.
In a second-best world we consider that each instrument is set indepen-
dently. We consider a tax on emissions and a uniform and a differentiated
subsidy to each R&D sector. Our results suggest that to achieve the efficient
level of emissions intensity through pricing policies alone, the costs imposed
are too high, as the price required to create incentives for clean technologies
is too high, decreasing economic activity by more than desirable. Moreover,
it has been shown in the literature that in order to provide incentives for
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firms to invest in the development of those technologies, credible commit-
ments to meeting long-run emissions targets without imposing unnecessarily
high near-term costs have to be provided. The fact that the caps to be set
in the future are those that are relevant for innovation, and that it is not
possible at present to credibly impose strict future targets gives additional
importance to policies that increase government funding or incentives for
private funding of research directed toward cleaner technologies (grants and
tax incentives, prizes, R&D consortia). In this case, we show that in an
economy that cares about the quality of the environment it is better to dis-
criminate between the two R&D sectors rather than to set a homogeneous
subsidy to both sectors. However, we have shown that in order to achieve
the efficient level of emissions intensity, besides subsidizing the two R&D
sectors differently, an additional tax on the polluting good is needed.
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Appendix A - Endogeneity of κ
Equation (24) can be rewritten as κ = 1 − µ(1−γ)
C
Y . Thus, to obtain κ,
we must derive the consumption to output ratio, CY , at the optimal solution.
Share of output devoted to consumption (C/Y )14
In order to obtain C/Y , we need to make use of the final good resource




Y . Thus, we need to
determine I/Y and R/Y .
The total cost of producing L and Z-complementary intermediates is
I = ψx∗L (j)NL + ψx
∗
Z (j)NZ . Substituting (37) and (38) into the produc-
tion functions (3), and solving for the total amount of intermediates pur-







Yi (1− β) . Together with
















, the share of final good invested in intermediate inputs





From (4), R&D expenditures in each sector can be written as Ri =
g∗Ni/ηi. From (27), (29), (32), (34), (37) and the production function for
YL after substituting for x
∗





























































14We follow Di Maria and Smulders [6], in a different context.








Substituting CY in κ (equation (24)), we get
κ = 1− ϕ(κ), where (48)
ϕ(κ) =
µρ














γ + (1− γ)µρ
Let κ = {κs} represent the set of solutions for this equation.









< 0. In other words, at the equilibrium value of κs, as (1− ϕ(κ)) is



























































< 1 is equivalent to having the denominator of
∂κ(κs)
∂µ
positive. Since the numerator of ∂κ(κs)
∂µ
is negative, then ∂κ(κs)
∂µ
< 0.
On the other hand, if ∂κ(κs)
∂µ
< 0, since the numerator is negative, then the
denominator has to be positive, implying that ∂(1−ϕ(κs))
∂κ
< 1.
The solution can be shown graphically. When 1− γ  β (that is, when
the share of YZ on Y is less than or equal to the share of Z on YZ), 1−ϕ(κ)
is concave. Figure 1 illustrates the left-hand side and the right-hand side of
equation (48), for a given µ, when 1− γ  β.
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When 1− γ > β, 1−ϕ(κ) is convex for κ < κ̂, and concave for κ > κ̂.16
Figure 2 illustrates this case.
In both cases, as µ increases, 1 − ϕ(κ) crosses the horizontal axis at a
higher κ.17 Also, when 1− γ > β, the inflection point, κ̂, is increasing in µ.
Thus, the right-hand side of equation (48) moves to the right.
There is a solution for equation (48) as long as ∃ κ : 1−ϕ(κ) > κ, that is,




























Figure 1: κ = 1− ϕ(κ) (eq. (48)), when 1− γ  β
Appendix B - Proof (Proposition 4)























After substituting for the efficient marginal rate of transformation between
the two goods, with endogenous technical change (equation (40), and (NZ/NL)

















































Figure 2: κ = 1− ϕ(κ) (eq. (48)), when 1− γ > β







































































By differentiating YYL and
Y
YZ
with respect to µ, it follows that YL becomes
relatively more important in the production of the final output the higher
µ is, and the opposite occurs with YZ .
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The optimal share of output devoted to consumption, investment and

















g∗+ρ > 0. Thus,
C
Y
> 0, as long
as the denominator 1 − µ
[






g∗+ρ > 0, which is
true if µ < 1.
(ii) C
Y








, that is, βρ−(g
∗+ρ)+µ[(1−β)(g∗+ρ)+βg∗]
g∗+ρ <
0. Since g∗+ ρ > 0, the numerator must be negative. After some algebra, it
can be rewritten as βρ− (g∗ + ρ) < 0. Since β ∈ (0, 1), βρ < ρ holds. Thus,
βρ < g∗ + ρ also holds because g∗ > 0.


















(i) This ratio is positive because β ∈ (0, 1) and 1− µCY > 0.













(i) This ratio is positive because βg
∗






< 1, because βg∗ < g∗ + ρ and 0 < µC
Y
< 1.




























































































β (1− γ) (ηZZ)




























































β (1− γ) (ηZZ)






















































∂µ < 0 because
∂κ
∂µ < 0
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